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where the CPS is asked to advise) and will depend on the integrity and intelli-
gence with which such policies are applied. Ensuring that forces apply policy
statements appropriately will depend on HMI and Home O⁄ce scrutiny. The
promulgation by the Home O⁄ce of an overarching Circular dealing with the
system of diversions as, essentially, an administrative Code might be helpful both
to set broad policy and to eliminate the inconsistencies which the majority of the
Court perceived inMondelly. Such a Codemight conduce to better administration
of the diversion schemes with which it dealt and encourage control by way of
judicial review at themargin. But whether wewill see the emergence of anything
like the Codes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which have
done so much to regulate the use of police powers remains to be seen. And the
Courts, alas, have opted out.
Stop and SearchUnder theTerrorism Act 2000: A
Comment onR (Gillan) vCommissioner of Police
for theMetropolis
Daniel Moecklin
INTRODUCTION
In the ¢ve years since the attacks of 11September 2001, law enforcement agencies
have been granted ever more special powers to counter terrorism.To name but a
few examples, whilst the Terrorism Act 2000 had already created a power to
authorise police o⁄cers to carry out blanket stop and searches,1 since 2001 such
authorisations have been made on an unprecedented scale;2 the Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and SecurityAct 2001has introduced new powers of theTreasury to freeze
terrorist funds;3 the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 has given the Home Secre-
tary the authority to impose so-called ‘control orders’ on terrorist suspects;4
and the Terrorism Act 2006 has given the police the power to detain terrorist
suspects for up to 28 days.5 Since, as the head of the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the
nSchool of Law,Universityof Nottingham. I amgrateful to Conor Gearty andColinWarbrick for (re-)
sparking my interest in the Gillan case and to Sangeeta Shah and Tufyal Choudhury for their helpful
comments and advice.
1 Terrorism Act 2000, s 44.
2 Lord Carlile of Berriew, Report on the Operation in 2004 of theTerrorism Act 2000, 24, at http://security.
homeo⁄ce.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/independent-reviews/Terrorism_Act_Report1.
pdf?view=Binary (last visited 15March 2007).
3 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and SecurityAct 2001, ss 4^16.
4 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ss 1^2.
5 Terrorism Act 2006, s 23 in conjunctionwithTerrorism Act 2000, Sched 8.
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Metropolitan Police put it,‘[p]ublic safetydemands earlier intervention,’6 all these
recent changes have been designed to increase the capacity of law enforcement
authorities to detect and deter terrorist activities in their early stages. Anti-terror-
ism policing has become increasingly preventive instead of reactive.7
At the same time, law enforcement authorities enjoy extremely wide discretion
in deciding how ^ and in particular against whom ^ to use these far-reaching
powers. For the making of a control order, for example, it is su⁄cient that the
Home Secretary has ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or
has been involved in terrorism-related activity’ and that he considers the imposi-
tion of a control order necessary for the protection of the public;8 the courts’
supervisory role is limited to considering whether the Home Secretary’s decision
is ‘obviously £awed’.9 In the case of the stop and search powers under sections
44^47 of theTerrorismAct 2000 the threshold is even lower: once an area has been
designated under section 44, the police can stop and search peoplewithout having
to show reasonable suspicion at all.10 The granting of such discretionary powers
raises a number of complex human rights issues, not least with regard to the pro-
hibition of discrimination. R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis11
gave the House of Lords the opportunity to clarify some of these issues and to
de¢ne clear parameters for the exercise of preventive anti-terrorism
powers. This note argues that, unfortunately, their Lordships failed to take this
opportunity.
This note begins with a description of the stop and search regime under the
Terrorism Act 2000 that formed the background to the Gillan case. Next, it pro-
vides a brief summaryof the case itself.The third andmain part of the note exam-
ines the comments that some of their Lordshipsmade on the relationship between
anti-terrorism stop and search and the prohibition of discrimination.
STOPANDSEARCHUNDERTHETERRORISM ACT 2000
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that a senior police o⁄cer can
authorise the use of blanket stop and search powers in a designated area if he or
she‘considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism.’12 Authorisations
can be given for renewable periods of up to 28 days13 but must be con¢rmed by
the Home Secretary within 48 hours, otherwise they lapse.14 Once an authorisa-
tion under section 44 has been made, the police can stop and search any vehicle
or pedestrian: there do not have to be grounds for suspecting that the person
6 House of Commons HomeA¡airs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2005^06:TerrorismDetention
PowersHC 910-I, 54.
7 ibid.
8 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, s 2(1).
9 ibid, s 3(2). For a discussion of the problems that this wide discretion raises with regard to the pro-
hibition of torture, seeAand others v Secretary of State for theHomeDepartment (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221;
[2005] 3WLR1249, at [77]^[78], per Lord Nicholls.
10 Terrorism Act 2000, s 45(1)(b).
11 [2006] 2 AC 307; [2006] 2 WLR 537.
12 Terrorism Act 2000, s 44(3).
13 ibid, s 46(2).
14 ibid, s 46(4).
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concerned is, or has been, involved in terrorist activity.15 However, the Act also
makes clear that these powers may only be used to search for articles that could
be used in connection with terrorism.16 Code A to the Police and Criminal Evi-
dence Act 1984 (PACE), issued by the Home Secretary, o¡ers some guidance as to
how the stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 should be exer-
cised.17 In particular, Code A states: ‘O⁄cers must take particular care not to dis-
criminate against members of minority ethnic groups in the exercise of these
powers.There may be circumstances, however, where it is appropriate for o⁄cers
to take account of a person’s ethnic origin in selecting persons to be stopped in
response to a speci¢c terrorist threat (for example, some international terrorist
groups are associated with particular ethnic identities).’18
Since11September 2001, authorisations for blanket stop and searches have been
used extensively and in almost every police authority area in Great Britain,
including on a rolling basis in the Londonmetropolitan area.19 As a consequence,
tens of thousands of people have been stopped and searched under theTerrorism
Act 2000: the number of searches has constantly risen from 8,550 in the year 2001/
0220 to 32,086 in 2004/05.21
The available evidence suggests that the increase in the use of these powers has
disproportionately a¡ected ethnic minorities. Between 2001/02 and 2002/03, for
example, the number of persons of Asian ethnicity subjected to section 44
searches rose by 302 percent as compared to a rise of 118 percent for white peo-
ple.22 By 2003/04, Asian peoplewere about 2.9 timesmore likely, and black people
about 3.3 times more likely, to be stopped and searched under theTerrorism Act
2000 thanwhite people.23 In the ¢rst two months after the London bombings of
July 2005, the number of Asian and black people stopped in the London metro-
politan area under section 44 increased twelvefold on the same period in 2004; for
white people the increase was ¢vefold.24
Various statements by government o⁄cials suggest that this disparate use of
stop and search powers under theTerrorism Act 2000 is not simply the result of
decisions taken by o⁄cers in the ¢eld but part of a concerted e¡ort to focus law
enforcement resources on certain ethnic groups. For instance, the then Home
O⁄ce Minister, Hazel Blears, made clear that the nature of the terrorist threat
‘inevitably means that some of our counter-terrorist powers will be disproportio-
nately experienced by people in the Muslim community.’25 Similarly, the Chief
15 ibid, s 45(1)(b).
16 ibid, s 45(1)(a).
17 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Code A: Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police O⁄-
cers of Statutory Powers of Stop and Search.
18 ibid, para 2.25.
19 Lord Carlile of Berriew, n 2 above, 24^25; Lord Carlile of Berriew,Report on theOperation in 2005 of
the Terrorism Act 2000, 27, at http://security.homeo⁄ce.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-
search/independent-reviews/tact-2005-review?view=Binary (last visited 15 March 2007).
20 Home O⁄ce, Statistics on Race and the CriminalJustice System ^ 2003 (2004), 28.
21 Home O⁄ce, Statistics on Race and the CriminalJustice System ^ 2005 (2006), 31.
22 Home O⁄ce, n 20 above, 28.
23 Home O⁄ce, n 21 above, 31.
24 V. Dodd,‘Surge in Stop and Search of Asian People after July 7’TheGuardian 24 December 2005.
25 House of Commons Home A¡airs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2004^05:Terrorism and Com-
munity RelationsHC165-I, 46.
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Constable of the British Transport Police has stated: ‘We should not waste time
searching old white ladies. It is going to be disproportionate. It is going to be
young men, not exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to
ethnic groups.’26
THEGILLANCASE
In the metropolitan police district, an authorisation under section 44 of theTer-
rorism Act 2000 has, as explained above, been in force continuously since 2001.
Gillan concerned a student and a journalist who, while on their way to a demon-
stration against an arms fair in London, were stopped and searched by police o⁄-
cers pursuant to this authorisation. Nothing incriminatingwas found on either of
them. They applied for judicial review but were unsuccessful both before the
Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal.
The House of Lords dismissed their appeals. It held, ¢rst, that the authorisation
under section 44, as well as its con¢rmation by the Home Secretary, were lawful.
The provisions of theTerrorismAct 2000 relating to stop and searchwere speci¢c
and unambiguous and embodied a series of constraints so that an authorisation
could only be given if it seemed likely that the powers would be of signi¢cant
practical value and utility in seeking to achieve the prevention of terrorist acts.27
In addition, the court was satis¢ed that both the geographical scope and the dura-
tion of the authorisation were justi¢ed.28 Second, their Lordships found the
authorisation for the use of stop and search powers to be compatible with human
rights guarantees. A stop and search under section 44, they deemed, did not
amount to a deprivation of liberty in the sense of Article 5 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, even if it did, was justi¢ed as a lawful
arrest underArticle 5(1)(b) of the ECHR.29 Similarly, a proper exercise of the stop
and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 did not necessarily involve an
interference with the right to respect for private life guaranteed byArticle 8 of
the ECHR and was, in any event, a proportionate response to the danger of
terrorism.30
At the very least the ¢nding that a stop and search under the Terrorism Act
2000 does not even amount to an interference with Article 5 of the ECHR seems
questionable. As has been pointed out elsewhere, to portray the stop and search
process, as Lord Bingham did, as akin to being ‘kept from proceeding or kept
waiting’31 as would apply if waiting for the green light at a pedestrian crossing, is
not very convincing.32 But it is another human rights issue raised by the Gillan
case that is the focus of the remainder of this note ^ discrimination. The House
of Lords realised that the discretionary stop and search powers under section 44
26 V. Dodd,‘Asian MenTargeted in Stop and Search’The Guardian, 17 August 2005.
27 n 11 above, at [14]^[15], per Lord Bingham.
28 ibid at [16]^[18], per Lord Bingham.
29 ibid at [21]^[26], per Lord Bingham.
30 ibid at [27]^[29], per Lord Bingham.
31 ibid at [25].
32 ‘Case Comment: Police Powers ^WhetherAuthorisation Given underTerrorism Legislation Law-
ful’ [2006] Crim LR 751, 755.
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are ‘clearly open to abuse’.33 Therefore, even though neither of the appellants in
Gillan was from an ethnic minority and so the issue did not arise on the facts,
some of their Lordships found it necessary to enter into a rather lengthy examina-
tion of the question of discrimination. Apparently with the ethnic disparities in
stop and search rates and the statements by government o⁄cials quoted above in
mind, Lord Hope summarised the key question to be answered in this regard as
follows: ‘What then if it is found that the police are using the section 44 power
more frequently to stop Asians than other racial groups in the community?’34
Does this scenario, which ^ as shown above ^ re£ects reality, amount to discrimi-
nation?Or is this law enforcement practice, commonlydescribed as ‘racial’ or ‘eth-
nic pro¢ling’,35 compatible with the prohibition of discrimination?
ETHNIC PROFILINGANDTHE PROHIBITIONOF DISCRIMINATION
In the United Kingdom, discrimination on racial grounds, including grounds of
colour, race, or ethnic or national origins, is prohibited by theRace Relations Act
1976.36 Since its amendment in 2000, this Act applies not only to acts of private
persons but also to the exercise of public functions by public authorities, includ-
ing the police.37 In addition, discrimination on grounds such as race, colour, reli-
gion, national origin or other status is also prohibited byArticle 14 of the ECHR,
as far as the enjoyment of rights guaranteed under that Convention is con-
cerned.38 The ECHR rights, including Article 14, have been given‘further e¡ect’
in domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998, which makes it ‘unlawful for a
public authority to act in awaywhich is incompatiblewith a Convention right’.39
Neither Lord Bingham nor LordWalker saw a need to address the question of
whether ethnic pro¢ling in the anti-terrorism context is compatible with these
non-discrimination norms.40 Lords Hope, Scott and Brown, in contrast, did
examine the practice and found it to be justi¢ed on a number of di¡erent
grounds.Their obiter dicta on this point are problematic for several reasons.
Justi¢cations for ethnic pro¢ling
For Lord Scott, the answer to the discrimination questionwas straightforward. As
far as the use of the stop and search powers under theTerrorism Act 2000 ‘might
require some degree of stereotyping in the selection of the persons to be stopped
33 n 11above at [74], per Lord Brown.
34 ibid at [43].
35 See D. Harris, Pro¢les in Injustice:Why Racial Pro¢ling CannotWork (NewYork: New Press, 2003)
10^11.
36 Race Relations Act 1976 (as amended), ss 1 and 3(1).
37 ibid, s 19B.
38 Article14 of the ECHR states: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Conven-
tion shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.’
39 Human Rights Act 1998, preamble and s 6(1).
40 n 11 above at [35] and [70].
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and searched and arguably, therefore, some degree of discrimination’, he argued,
this would ‘be validated by the statutory authority of the 2000 Act (see s.41(1)(a)
and s.42 of the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended).’41 The provisions of the
Race Relations Act cited by Lord Scott make clear that the Act does not render
unlawful any act of discrimination‘done in pursuance of any enactment or Order
in Council’ or, respectively, ‘done for the purpose of safeguarding national secur-
ity if the doing of the act was justi¢ed by that purpose.’ However, it would seem
that the objective of theTerrorism Act 2000 is to give the police special powers to
target terrorists, not a particular racial group; nor is it obvious that discrimination
against persons of Asian appearance is inherently necessary for the purpose of
safeguarding national security.42
There is a further, more fundamental, £aw in Lord Scott’s argument. Even if it
was true that the prohibition of discrimination of theRaceRelations Act does not
apply, discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds is, as explained above, also pro-
hibited by the ECHR. Article 14 of the ECHR guarantees that the Convention
rights shall be secured without discrimination and thus provides protection from
discrimination as far as the action complained of falls within the ambit of one of
the substantiveConvention rights. As Lords Bingham andBrown acknowledged,
at least in certain cases stop and searches will be su⁄ciently intrusive to engage a
person’s Article 8 right to respect for private life.43 As a consequence, they must
not only be compatible with the prohibition of discrimination of the Race Rela-
tions Act but alsowith that of the ECHR.
Unlike Lord Scott, Lords Hope and Brown proceeded to a substantive analysis
of the discrimination issue. Lord Brown seemed to suggest that in determining
whether discrimination has occurred or not, one important factor was the reason
behind the di¡erence in treatment: ‘Ethnic origin . . . can and properly should be
taken into account in deciding whether and whom to stop and search provided
always that . . . the selection is made for reasons connected with the perceived
terrorist threat and not on grounds of racial discrimination.’44 Yet, in fact, under
both the Race Relations Act and Article 14 of the ECHR, the reasonwhy some-
one has been treated less favourably is irrelevant to the discrimination inquiry: it is
su⁄cient to show that there has been a di¡erence in treatment on grounds of race
or ethnic origin, whether the alleged discriminator’s intention was benign or
not.45 This point was acknowledged by Lord Hope.46
In Lord Hope’s view, the key to deciding whether ethnic pro¢ling in the anti-
terrorism context amounts to discrimination or not lies in the test set out by the
House of Lords in the Roma Rights case.47 In that case, the House found unlawful
41 ibid at [68].
42 See also ‘Case Comment: Police Powers ^ WhetherAuthorisation Given underTerrorism Legisla-
tion Lawful’, n 32 above, 755.
43 n 11 above at [28] and [74].
44 ibid at [81].
45 For the Race Relations Act 1976, see Nagarajan v London RegionalTransport [2000] 1 AC 501, 511; R
(EuropeanRomaRights Centre) v ImmigrationO⁄cer at PragueAirport (UnitedNations High Commissioner
for Refugees intervening) [2005] 2WLR1, 46. For the ECHR, see Belgian Linguistics Case (No 2) (1968)
1EHRR 252 at [10].
46 n 11 above at [44].
47 R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration O⁄cer at PragueAirport (United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees intervening), n 45 above.
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an operation whereby British immigration o⁄cers at Prague Airport routinely
treatedRomapassengerswithmore suspicion and subjected them tomore intense
and intrusive questioning than non-Roma. The central reason why the Prague
operationwas found to be discriminatory, both LordHope and Lord Brown con-
cluded in Gillan, was that Roma passengers were not treated as individuals but
assumed to be like all other members of their ethnic group: that ‘all Roma were
being treated in the same way simply because they were Roma.’48 Applied to the
anti-terrorism context this means, according to Lord Hope, that persons cannot
be stopped and searched merely because they appear to be of Asian origin but that
theremust be ‘other, further, good reasons for doing so.’49WhileAsian appearance
‘may attract the constable’s attention in the ¢rst place’, this must be followed
by a ‘further selection process’ based on criteria such as age, behaviour and
general appearance, ‘even if in the end it is based more on a hunch than on
something that can be precisely articulated or identi¢ed.’50 Similarly, Lord Brown
concluded that it is ‘unacceptable to pro¢le someone solely by reference to his
ethnicity’, but that the police can rely on ethnic origin as long as they ‘have regard
to other factors too.’51
The problems with ethnic pro¢ling
There are two problems with this ‘further factors’ test.The ¢rst problem is that it
fails to provide clear guidance as to what is discriminatory and what is not. The
fact that Lords Hope and Brown stressed that the police may not target people
solely because of their ethnic appearance seems to suggest that pro¢ling would
automatically be permissible if it is based on at least one further element in addi-
tion to race or ethnicity. As a consequence, it would be lawful for the police to
stop and search, say, all Asian males. Or the use of the plural in ‘further factors’
could mean that at least two additional indicators are required for a permissible
pro¢le, for example all Asian males (gender) between 18 and 40 (age). Instead of
the mere number of factors, the test suggested by Lords Hope and Brown could
also be interpreted as referring to the importance attached to, respectively, ethni-
city and additional factors. But what degree of importance attached to ethnicity
would make a pro¢le discriminatory? According to Lord Brown, a pro¢le may
‘sometimes’ still be permissible even if ethnic origin is a ‘highly material part’ of
it.52 But what exactly does this mean and how can one measure the importance
attached to the respective elements?
The second, more fundamental, problem is that it is doubtful that the ‘further
factors’ test really provides the relevant criteria to determine whether a stop and
search violates the non-discrimination norms at issue or not. As far as the Race
Relations Act 1976 is concerned, the singling out of persons for stop and search
based on their ethnic appearancemay amount to direct discrimination, de¢ned by
48 n 11above at [45], per Lord Hope. See also ibid at [90], per Lord Brown.
49 ibid at [45].
50 ibid at [46].
51 ibid at [91] (emphasis added).
52 ibid.
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the Act as less favourable treatment on racial or ethnic grounds.53 As the Court of
Appeal correctlyobserved inOwen&BriggsvJames, nothing in the language of the
Act suggests that there can be no discrimination unless the racial factor was the sole
reason for the less favourable treatment.54 Put otherwise, the existence of other
factors than race or ethnic origin does not necessarily make the di¡erential treat-
ment lawful. Instead, it is su⁄cient that race or ethnicity was an important factor.55
It would, indeed, seem strange if the targeting of persons of Asian appearance by
the police became permissible simply because the further element of, for example,
gender was added to the pro¢le. As a result, as far as ethnic appearance is used to
‘attract the constable’s attention in the ¢rst place’ or where it plays a ‘highly mate-
rial part’ in the selection process ^ the terms used by Lords Hope and Brown ^ the
relevant stop and searches will be incompatible with the Race Relations Act 1976.
If, however, as Lord Scott contends, the prohibition of discrimination under
the Race Relations Act is inapplicable because of the statutory authority and
national security exceptions of sections 41 and 42, then stop and search practices
will still need to comply with Article 14 of the ECHR.The concept of discrimi-
nation under the ECHRdi¡ers from that of direct discrimination under theRace
Relations Act in that di¡erential treatment based on race or ethnic origin is poten-
tially justi¢able. In the Belgian Linguistics case, the European Court of Human
Rights held that Article 14 is only violated ‘if the distinction has no objective
and reasonable justi¢cation’.56 To meet this justi¢cation test, the di¡erence in
treatment must, ¢rst, pursue a legitimate aim and, second, be a proportionate
means to achieve that aim.57
As far as the ¢rst requirement is concerned, the aim of the stop and search prac-
tices at issue is the prevention of terrorist acts. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a
legitimate, even compelling, governmental interest.The crucial question is there-
fore whether reliance on race or ethnic origin to determine whom to stop and
search can be deemed aproportionatemeans to achieve that aim.This proportion-
ality assessment as required byArticle 14 of the ECHR is much more complex
than the ‘further factors’ test of Lords Hope and Brown implies.The principle of
proportionality requires that factors such as the appropriateness and e¡ectiveness
of the measures and distinctions under consideration, as well as their e¡ects on
groups or individuals, be taken into account.58 Thus, in the present context, the
following questions are particularly relevant: Does the use of ethnicity re£ect spe-
ci¢c intelligence or just unexamined assumptions? Are terrorist pro¢les based on
ethnic appearance accurate? Or are they over- or under-inclusive? Are stop and
searches based on ethnic pro¢ling e¡ective?What are their impacts on the a¡ected
groups? These issues are now considered in turn.
53 Race Relations Act 1976, s 1(1)(a). For a discussion of the distinction between direct and indirect
discrimination in the context of stop and search, see L. Lustgarten,‘The Future of Stop and Search’
[2002] Crim LR 603.
54 [1982] ICR 618, 623.
55 ibid, 624.
56 Belgian Linguistics Case (No 2) n 45 above at [10].
57 ibid.
58 See, eg, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at [81] and National
Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1975) 1EHRR 578 at [49].
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Their Lordships’ comments on the discrimination issue are based on the pre-
mise that ethnic appearance is in fact a useful element for a terrorist pro¢le. Lord
Hope thought that terrorists ‘are likely to be linked to sectors of the community
that, because of their racial, ethnic or geographical origins, are readily identi¢-
able.’59 Lord Brown even found it ‘inevitable . . . that so long as the principal ter-
rorist risk against which use of the section 44 power has been authorised is that
from al Qaeda, a disproportionate number of those stopped and searched will be
of Asian appearance.’60 Yet none of their Lordships provided evidence in support
of this alleged link between Asian appearance and increased likelihood of invol-
vement in terrorist activities, instead repeatedly invoking ‘common sense’.61 But
the appeal to common sense cannot compensate for the fact that a statistically
signi¢cant demonstration of the correlation between ethnic origin and terrorism
involvement has never been made. On the contrary, the report of the O⁄cial
Account of the London Bombings concluded that, as far as the national, ethnic
and social background of potential terrorists is concerned,‘there is not a consistent
pro¢le to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation.’62
In practice, racial or ethnic appearance is generally used as a proxy trait forMuslim
religion, as religious a⁄liation is not readily identi¢able and, in any case, easy to con-
ceal.YetAsian appearance is avery poor proxy forMuslim religion: onlyhalf of those
belonging to this ethnic group are in fact Muslims.63 Thus, pro¢les based on Asian
appearance are overbroad in two respects. First, manyof those matching this element
will not be Muslim. Second, the overwhelming majority of those who areMuslim
have, of course, nothing to do with terrorism. As a consequence, stop and searches
basedon ethnic pro¢lingare highlyover-inclusive, a¡ecting ^basedon anunsubstan-
tiated assumption ^ thousands of people who are in noway linked to terrorism.One
may wonder, for instance, whether the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, the
Brazilian mistaken for a terrorist trying to blow up a London underground train,
was not a tragic consequence of the over-reliance on stereotypical characteristics such
as ethnic appearance in anti-terrorism operations.64
At the same time, pro¢les based on ethnicity are also under-inclusive in that
they may lead police o⁄cers to miss a range of potential terrorists who do not ¢t
the pro¢le.Terrorist groups have regularly proved their ability to adapt their stra-
tegies, with the use of female and child suicide bombers to avoid the stereotype of
the male terrorist as just one example.65 At present, the main concern of intelli-
gence services in this regard is that Islamist terrorist groups may increasingly rely
on converts.66 This demonstrates that pro¢les based on physical characteristics,
including ethnic appearance, can easily become self-defeating.
59 n 11 above at [42].
60 ibid at [80].
61 ibid at [42], [88].
62 Report of the O⁄cial Account of the Bombings in London on 7thJuly 2005, HC1087, 31.
63 House of Commons HomeA¡airs Committee, n 25 above, 21.
64 SeeR. Cowan,D. Campbell andV.Dodd,‘NewClaims Emerge overMenezes Death’TheGuardian
17 August 2005.
65 See, eg, D. D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, Strategic Studies Institute (2004), at http://www.stra
tegicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pd⁄les/PUB408.pdf (last visited 15 March 2007) and D. Leppard,
‘Watch forWomen and Child Bombers, Says Met’SundayTimes 7 August 2005.
66 R. S. Leiken,‘Fair Game: Al Qaeda’s New Soldiers’The NewRepublic 26 April 2004.
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What is evenworse, such pro¢les can shift the attention of police o⁄cers away
from more pertinent indicators such as behavioural or psychological characteris-
tics.The importance of focusing on behavioural patterns is highlighted, for exam-
ple, by the experiences of theUSCustoms Service. In the late 1990s, the Customs
Service stopped using a pro¢le that was based, among other factors, on ethnicity
and gender in deciding whom to search for drugs.67 Instead, the customs agents
were instructed to rely on observational techniques, behavioural analysis and
intelligence.68 This policy change resulted in a rise in the proportion of searches
leading to the discovery of drugs of more than 300 per cent.69 Behaviour would
seem to be an equally signi¢cant indicator in the terrorism context.70
Given these de¢ciencies of ethnic pro¢ling, it is not surprising that the wide-
spread, and ethnically biased, use of stop and search powers has proved largely
unsuccessful. In 2003/04, for example, 8,120 pedestrians were stopped under sec-
tion 44 of theTerrorism Act 2000.Yet these stops led to only ¢ve arrests in con-
nection with terrorism ^ a ‘success rate’ of 0.06 percent. Incidentally, all of those
arrested were white.71 Similarly, the further increase in stop and searches in the
¢rst two months after the London bombings has not resulted in any arrests or
charges related to terrorism.72 The police often try to justify this lack of e¡ective-
ness by stressing that the main aim of stop and searches was not the detection of
potential terrorists but deterrence and disruption,73 a point that was also made by
Lord Brown.74 Yet no evidence has been adduced in support of this alleged deter-
rent e¡ect. Even if stop and search powers did have such an e¡ect, this could still
not justify their selective use: any policy of deterrence would need to be directed
against potential terrorists rather than particular ethnic groups.
Finally, stop and searches based on ethnic pro¢ling entail considerable negative
e¡ects that must also be factored into the proportionality assessment. Terrorist
pro¢ling practices single out persons for enhanced law enforcement attention
simply because they match a set of group characteristics, thus contributing to the
social construction of all those who share these characteristics as inherently sus-
pect. The stigmatisation, and consequential alienation, of certain ethnic groups
has signi¢cant negative implications for law enforcement e¡orts, as it involves a
deep mistrust of the police. The Metropolitan Police Authority has highlighted
‘the huge negative impact’ of the use of stop and search powers on community
relations: ‘It has increased the level of distrust of our police; it has created deeper
racial and ethnic tensions against the police . . . it has cut o¡ valuable sources of
community information and intelligence.’75 In a similar vein, the Commissioner
67 US General Accounting O⁄ce, U.S. Customs Service: BetterTargeting of Airline Passengers for Personal
Searches Could Produce Better Results, March 2000, GAO/GGD-00-38,10^15.
68 ibid, 5^6 and 16.
69 Lamberth Consulting, ‘Racial Pro¢ling Doesn’t Work’ at http://www.lamberthconsulting.com/
about-racial-pro¢ling/racial-pro¢ling-doesnt-work.asp (last visited 15 March 2007).
70 See B. Dedman,‘Words of Caution on Airport Security: MemoWarns against Use of Pro¢ling as
Defense’The Boston Globe12 October 2001.
71 Home O⁄ce, Statistics on Race and the CriminalJustice System ^ 2004 (2005), 35.
72 Dodd, n 26 above.
73 See House of Commons HomeA¡airs Committee, n 25 above,18.
74 n 11 above at [77].
75 House of Commons HomeA¡airs Committee,Written Evidence:Memorandum submitted by theMetro-
politan PoliceAuthority, 8 July 2004, HC 886-i.
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for Human Rights of the Council of Europe remarked about the increase in stop
and searches of Asians that ‘[t]he maintenance of good community relations is
clearly di⁄cult under such circumstances.’76
To conclude, a careful analysis of the use of anti-terrorism stop and search
powers based on ethnic pro¢ling shows that this practice will regularly fail to
meet the proportionality requirement of Article 14 of the ECHR: not only is it
an unsuitable and ine¡ective means of preventing terrorism, a¡ecting thousands
of innocent people, but it also entails considerable negative consequences that
may render it counterproductive in the ¢ght against terrorism. This is not to
argue that the police are never allowed to use terrorist pro¢les that include ethni-
city as an element. For example, if there is speci¢c intelligence suggesting that
someone ¢tting a particular pro¢le is preparing a terrorist act, then ethnic
appearance may be legitimately employed to target the relevant search e¡orts.
The situation is di¡erent, however, in the case of widespread use of preventive
anti-terrorism powers that is not intelligence-led. While pro¢les used for this
purpose may include behavioural or psychological characteristics, they may not
be based on unexamined, stereotypical assumptions that certain ethnic groups
pose a greater terrorist risk than others.
CONCLUSION
As policing in the anti-terrorism context is shifting from a reactive to a preventive
approach, pro¢ling is likely to become an ever more important method of select-
ing persons for special law enforcement scrutiny.The EuropeanUnion (EU), for
example, has explicitly asked its member states to cooperate with one another and
with Europol to develop‘terrorist pro¢les’, de¢ned as ‘set[s] of physical, psycholo-
gical or behavioural variables, which have been identi¢ed as typical of persons
involved in terrorist activities and which may have some predictive value in that
respect.’77 A group of experts from Europol and several EU member states has
been established for this purpose.78
To ensure that preventive anti-terrorism e¡orts comply with human rights
guarantees in general and the prohibition of discrimination in particular, it is cru-
cial that courts clarify whether and under which circumstances terrorist pro¢les
may be based on factors such as race and ethnicity. It is, after all, the judiciary’s
responsibility to de¢ne the limits that human rights obligations impose on gov-
ernmental actions, even as far as these actions are designed to prevent terrorism.79
Their Lordships’ obiter comments on the discrimination issue in Gillan fail to
76 Council of Europe, O⁄ce of the Commissioner for HumanRights,Report byMrAlvaroGil-Robles,
Commissioner for Human Rights, on hisVisit to the United Kingdom, 8 June 2005, CommDH (2005) 6,
para 34.
77 Council of the EuropeanUnion,Draft Council Recommendation on the development of terrorist pro¢les,18
November 2002, Doc 11858/3/02 REV 3.
78 Council of the European Union,Terrorist pro¢ling (Draft reply to written question by Sarah Ludford) 30
March 2004, Doc 7846/04.
79 Av Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 WLR 87 at [41]^[42], per
Lord Bingham. See also D. Feldman,‘HumanRights,Terrorism andRisk:TheRoles of Politicians
and Judges’ [2006] Public Law 364, 372^384.
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clarify these limits.The test they propose to distinguish discriminatory from law-
ful stop and searches is not only impracticable: it is also incompatible with the
non-discrimination norms of the Race Relations Act 1976 and the ECHR.
Canadian Courts Enforce Foreign Non-Money
Judgments
Richard Frimpong Oppongn
INTRODUCTION
A long settled common law rule is that courts can enforce only ¢nal money judg-
ments from foreign courts.1For centuries, the remarkable act of international judi-
cial cooperation that allowed foreign judgment creditors to enforce foreign
judgments in another state’s court was restricted to money judgments.The impli-
cation of this rule was that equitable remedies like speci¢c performance and
injunctions were not enforceable in a foreign court. The judgment creditor had
to institute a fresh action and adduce fresh evidence for similar relief in the foreign
court; he had to re-litigate the cause of action.
Two reasons can be pro¡ered for the rule. Historically, the proper action for the
enforcement of foreign judgmentswas an action in assumpsit.2 This common law
action required that the defendant owe the plainti¡ a sum certain in money. In
Sadler v Robins,3 it was held that ‘the law implies a promise to pay a de¢nite, not
an inde¢nite sum.’4 At common law the foreign judgment created an implied
promise and obligation to pay the judgment sum. It was reasoned that where a
competent court had adjudicated a certain sum to be due, a legal obligation arose
to pay it, and an action of debt to enforce the judgmentmaybemaintained.5 It did
not matter where that promise was made or the obligation arose; a man indebted
to another in one place is indebted to him in all places.6
nLLB, BL (Ghana) LLM (Cantab) LLM (Harvard).
1 Some writers have argued that there existed an equitable jurisdiction to enforce foreign non-
money judgments. See R.W.White,‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Equity’ (1980^1982) 9
Sydney LRev 630; D. Buzard,‘U.S. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Injunctive
and Speci¢c Performance Decrees’ (1989^90) 20 CalW Int’l L J 91.
2 See H. E. Read, Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in the Common LawUnits of the British
Commonwealth (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press,1938) 111^115;Walker vWitter (1778) 99 ER1.
3 Sadler vRobins (1808) 170 ER 948.
4 ibid, 948.
5 Russell v Smyth (1842) 152 ER 343.
6 Whitehead v Brown (1793) 83 ER 315.
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